Is the emperor wearing new clothes? A social assessment of the European Union 2007–2013
financial framework by Monsalve, Fabio et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cesr20
Economic Systems Research
ISSN: 0953-5314 (Print) 1469-5758 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cesr20
Is the emperor wearing new clothes? A social
assessment of the European Union 2007–2013
financial framework
Fabio Monsalve, Jorge Zafrilla, María-Ángeles Cadarso & Angela García-
Alaminos
To cite this article: Fabio Monsalve, Jorge Zafrilla, María-Ángeles Cadarso & Angela
García-Alaminos (2018): Is the emperor wearing new clothes? A social assessment of
the European Union 2007–2013 financial framework, Economic Systems Research, DOI:
10.1080/09535314.2018.1491391
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09535314.2018.1491391
View supplementary material 
Published online: 03 Jul 2018.




Is the emperor wearing new clothes? A social assessment of
the European Union 2007–2013 financial framework
Fabio Monsalve a, Jorge Zafrilla a, María-Ángeles Cadarso a and Angela
García-Alaminosa
aDepartment of Economic Analysis and Finance, University of Castilla-La Mancha, Albacete, Spain
ABSTRACT
Over the years, European leaders have proudly waved a social flag
as one of the European Union’s (EU) constituent and differentiat-
ing elements. This commitment is assessed here through the social
footprint of the European 2007–2013 multiannual financial frame-
work among the EU countries and, worldwide, using an extended
multiregional input–output model. The focus is on the quantity
and the quality of income and jobs generated. We find that well-
knowndifferences among its northern, southern and eastern regions
threaten the EU’s intentions for high social standards, enabling first-
and second-class winners. Core EU countries account for the most
of the Funds and, thus, most of the positive economic and social
impacts, mainly through spillovers from peripheral regions. Beyond
the EU borders, Funds expenditures induce capital compensation
boosts in emerging countries not balanced by a similar labor com-
pensation impulse. Indeed,China captures thebulkof low-skilledand
temporary employment.
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In 1952, Jean Monnet, architect of European unity, said ‘Nous ne coalison pas de Etats,
nous unissons des hommes’ or, in English, ‘We are not forming coalitions of States, we
are uniting men’. This quote encapsulates the deepest intention of European idealization:
social commitment.Over time, European leaders have vocally supported such social justice
but perhaps have been less financially supportive to that vision compared to other forms
of development. The importance of social justice is explicit in Article 3.3 of the Treaty on
EuropeanUnion (EU) which states ‘The Union shall combat social exclusion and discrimi-
nation, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women andmen,
solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’. And, later in TEU,
Article 3.5, the social commitment extends beyond the EU’s boundaries: ‘In its relations
with the wider world . . . It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development
of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication
of poverty and the protection of human rights . . . ’. All those social guiding principles
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shape the EU’s Acquis Communautaire (the body of common rights and obligations that
is binding on all the member states), which substantially promotes basic workers’ rights
and working conditions; universal and sustainable social protection; inclusive labor mar-
kets; effective social dialogue; and social cohesion. Not surprisingly, European countries
receive the highest scores on the Decent Work Index (Bonnet et al., 2003). Still accord-
ing to Vaughan-Whitehead (2015, p. 46) ‘compared with other countries and regions EU
countries are also characterized by high expenditure on social protection, grounded on the
principles of solidarity, equality and social cohesion that represent not only the cement but
also the “soul” of European “social market economy”’. Thus, the question is whether this
image of the EU as a social Shangri-La is at risk of being shredded due to unintended conse-
quences unleashed by the international fragmentation of the production and the complex
ramifications of global value chains associated with enhanced economic globalization. Or,
to put this inmore literary terms, and paraphrasingHansChristianAndersen’s well-known
fairy tale – Is the world’s social emperor wearing new clothes?
As is widely known, the EU plays an active role within its boundaries through finan-
cial intervention as laid down in its pluriannual budgets, known as financial perspec-
tives or multiannual financial framework (MFF). By funding selected policies and pro-
grams, the EU triggers demand shocks in targeted countries. Admittedly, some aspects
of those shocks can eventually spill over to its trade partners; therefore, via shockwaves
(spillover and leakage effects) should be expected between these EU epicenters (the coun-
tries directly targeted by the Fund) and global-value-chain neighbors both inside and
outside EU.
An empirical contribution of the present paper is an analysis of the social spillover and
leakage effects. The social dimension is evaluated throughout an analysis of income gen-
eration and distribution across countries, the employment creation by skill level and some
labor-quality indicators, such as temporary and part-time employment. This allows us to
assess the extent to which the economic impacts enabled by EU budgetary efforts meet
the ambitious social standards set in EU’s highest-order document. To assess the relative
social impacts within the EU of EU funds, we segregate Europe into three broad regions
following a proto-geographical criterion: northern Europe – the ‘core’, southern Europe –
Mediterranean countries ones plus Ireland; and eastern Europe – the newcomer economies
to the EU. The proposed classification fits with three distinctive ‘visions’ of the European
unity, which subsequently shape the economic role of each within the EU. This is a most
pertinent issue because if EU value chains become highly fragmented with high leakages to
other regions both inside and outside of the EU, policy-makers should craft multiregional
agreements that facilitate desired social goals (Los et al., 2015).
Our research approach relies on the extended multiregional input–output (E-MRIO)
model. The model itself accounts for total, direct and indirect, upstream burdens linked
to a given economic activity or policy expressed through a selected level of final demand.
In our research, changes in final demand are estimates of the expenditures embodied in
European Funds from 2007 to 2013. E-MRIO is the best tool for unraveling the intricacies
of international supply chains and a suitable, accurate way of measuring global footprints;
indeed, it is presently the norm for undertaking such calculations (Wiedmann et al., 2011;
Dietzenbacher et al., 2013; Wiedmann, 2015).
The ongoing international fragmentation of production chains, with an increasing share
of value added outside the country-of-completion and also themajor trade region to which
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the country belongs, suggests a transition from regional production systems to the ‘Fac-
tory World’ (Los et al., 2015). In such a global system in which countries and industries
are highly interconnected, microeconomic shocks can propagate worldwide and induce
macroeconomic fluctuations (Kali and Reyes, 2007; Cerina et al., 2015). For instance, a
static shock in an epicenter’s final demand can trigger dynamic changes in that nation’s key
sectors; these, in turn, can affect final demands of other countries. Such higher-order effects
can cause stronger spillovers via demand shocks than can direct trade links themselves
(Kireyev and Leonidov, 2015; Andritzky et al., 2016; Kireyev and Leonidov, 2016; Tran
et al., 2017). Focusing on the EU region, Alatriste-Contreras (2015) shows that the most
central sectors to the EU not only diffuse more broadly but also yield a greater aggregate
economic impact on the EU. Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015), for their part, consider
Europe as a hub-and-spoke system in which Germany, the United Kingdom and France
are the hubs or ‘headquarters economies’ that trade with a wide range of partners. On the
other hand, peripheral or ‘spoke’ European countries depend heavily on nearby advanced-
technology economies. Although peripheral areas received more funds, the intra-regional
network generates intense leakage from the peripheral economies into core economies. In
contrast, the opposite leakage from core to periphery appears to be weaker, at least accord-
ing to the Hobza, Zeugner and Martins (2012) and Picek and Schröder (2017). All in all,
these studies suggest that the EU is couched within an interdependent, complex global
network; and it is this global network, not individual countries or regions, that frames our
analysis for mapping the social footprint of the EU financial instruments.
Prior to E-MRIO analysis, social footprints were tough to tackle. Data inaccessibil-
ity was a key issue since satellite social accounts for most MRIO databases are limited
(McBain, 2014); So researchers had to develop their own, as we do here. Yet, recent
case studies do exist on social dimensions. Most address labor and related issues from
diverse perspectives: the master-servant relationships between developed and develop-
ing countries (Alsamawi et al., 2014a); the dependence of quasi-egalitarian economies
on imports from clear non-egalitarian economies (Alsamawi et al., 2014b); differences
in principles and working rights at the international level (Gómez-Paredes et al., 2015),
‘bad labor footprints’ (Simas et al., 2014); the presence of child labor (in the previously
cited articles) and the extremely low cost of substituting them in India (Gómez-Paredes
et al., 2016); or health and safety at work (Alsamawi et al., 2017). Sometimes, the social
dimension is emphasized inside the global concept of sustainability, including economic
and environmental aspects (Rodríguez-Serrano et al., 2016) or connecting with the social
development goals (Xiao et al., 2017b) and with the EU Sustainable Development Strat-
egy (Pelletier et al., 2018). Table S1 in online supplementary information (SI) to this paper
compares indicators, data sources and the scope of literature that explores social sustain-
ability through E-MRIO. In a nutshell, the literature depicts the social consequences of
an interconnected world; even though none of it deals with a deliberate demand shock
per se. Thus, this is our contribution to the literature since European Funds can have
co-benefits and adverse side effects in the social sphere that need systematic empirical
investigation that E-MRIO can yield.We also extend the range of social indicators to assess
both the quantity and the quality of income and job generation considering each EU region
peculiarities.
In line with most of the literature we find that developed countries not only are the eco-
nomic winners but also the social winners during the present era of globalization. We also
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demonstrate that, in fact, EU policies reinforce this state of affairs. Indeed, the EU is oper-
ating economically at multiple-speeds (Rakauskienė and Kozlovskij, 2014), which affects
how social impacts unfold within its borders, even though EU Funds may be distributed
with the best of intentions. As a consequence, we find that the European MFF as a whole,
not just European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development as investigated by Monsalve
et al. (2016), winds up mainly benefiting Europe’s most developed economies. Thus, the
MFF actually appear to accentuate the gap between targeted and nontargeted countries
rather than narrowing it – the social emperor seems to be wearing the same, old clothes.
2. Materials andmethods
In this section, we present themethods used in this study and describe the data foundation.
We start by describing the fundamentals of E-MRIO and its extensions for computing foot-
prints. We then detail the data sources and, specifically, the manner in which we elaborate
demand.
2.1. E-MRIO analysis
Standard E-MRIOmeasures the production requirements and the associated environmen-
tal impacts required to meet a selected level of final demand within a supply chain (Davis
and Caldeira, 2010; Steen-Olsen et al., 2012; Wiedmann et al., 2013). Given the increas-
ing national and international attention to social concerns, extensions of MRIO to social
dimensions are a natural next step (Hardadi and Pizzol, 2017). A global MRIO frame-
work, includes regions and nations with technology, and trade is divided into intermediate
trade, with specific industry destinations, and final trade. The basic E-MRIO equation is
as follows: F = f̂(I − A)−1ŷ, where f̂ is the target factor (either environmental or social)
diagonalized vector per unit of output, (I − A)−1 is the Leontief inverse matrix, and ŷ is
the diagonalized final demand per country (Miller and Blair, 2009; Monsalve et al., 2016).
A is the matrix of technical coefficients in a MRIO context, providing a detailed sector-
by-sector and region-by-region domestic intraregional structure and the trade matrices
from one region to another. To work with matrix forms in footprint estimations, MRIO
contexts provide more precise information; in this sense, we must also process the final
demand vectors. Similar to the technical coefficients matrix, the isolation of domestic and
final demand trade vectors between regions is required. The extension of the model to
compute different impacts is estimated by pre-multiplying the Leontief Inverse Matrix by
target factors provided by different satellite accounts. The diagonalization of those target
factor vectors (f̂) enables the estimation of multipliers and results in matrix form (Skelton
et al., 2011; Cadarso et al., 2012; Meng et al., 2014). F can be analyzed in different per-
spectives. The rows of F show the distribution of the impact that occurs in one sector of a
country when produced to attend all sectors and countries. This is the so-called produc-
tion based-approach. Conversely, the columns of F yield the impacts global impacts across
sectors of the production of a unit of final demand in a country. This is the consumption-
based approach (CBA) or factor footprint concept. Given that the present study assesses
the social pressures driven by the EUMFF across the world, we follow the CBA criteria to
include the whole global production chains.
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When the international trade is under analysis, E-MRIO models provide complete and
unique detail of the international supply chains in terms of impacts, information that
other models cannot yield. Triple bottom line (TBL) analysis assesses the economic, social
and environmental outcomes of reviewed policies (Foran et al., 2005; Wood and Garnett,
2010; Kucukvar et al., 2014). Specifically, Monsalve et al. (2016) have used TBL to deter-
mine the global losses or gains from intra-EU and non-intra-EU trade relations on target
regions due to trade changes from EFARD. We broaden the political scope by evaluat-
ing MFF as a whole. Thus, our elaboration of the structure of final demand in terms of
MFF expenditures, as nested in the E-MRIO analysis, is a key contribution of the present
work. We focus on the social dimension since social aspects tend to receive less atten-
tion than do economic or environmental aspects. Specifically, we evaluate the effects on
such World Input-Output Database (WIOD) measures (Timmer et al., 2015) as labor
compensation by skill category, capital compensation, and employment by skill category,
and to them we add our own indicators for temporary and part-time employment (see
Table S2 in SI). The distinctions between wages and capital compensation and between
skill levels and regions where the employment and income are generated are reasonable
proxies for the potential social impacts of the European Funds expenditure (Simas et al.,
2014).
2.2. Data processing
The following have been used as data foundations of this work:
(1) WIOD. This dataset provides, (1) the global interindustry transactions data covering
35 sectors and 40 countries plus one rest of the world (RoW) region; (2) some socio-
economic satellite accounts used in the course of this study; (a) labor by skill category
and (b) capital compensation as well as hours worked by skill category; and, (3) the
price levels of gross output, intermediate inputs and value added required to deflate
WIOD tables and compensation-satellite-accounts. The available and useful data for
our purposes covers 2007–2009.
(2) Fourth MFF (2007–2013) of the EU (European Commission, 2015). This financial
dataset feeds the final demand of the model
(3) EUROSTAT, Labour Force Survey, LFS (European Commission, 2016), ILOSTAT
database (ILO, 2016), ASPIRE (The World Bank, 2016), and other data from selected
statistical national agencies. These sources have been used to build the temporary and
partial employment satellite accounts at the ISIC-Rev.3 disaggregation level (18 sec-
tors). By merging these sources with WIOD, we do not compromise comparability,
at least according to EUROSTAT (2017a; 2017b) and Erumban et al. (2012). This
is because WIOD uses labor data from ESTAT National Accounts and because LFS
is frequently an input to employment estimates in national accounts since it is both
broadly comparable in terms of employment growth (see SI online for possible sources
of divergence). In addition, although ILO concepts reflect the concepts in national
accounts, ILO has separate aims and measurement approaches, which in turn could
lead to different results. EUROSTAT also provides price levels to deflate EU financial
datasets.
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We deflated all data – WIOD, the compensation satellite accounts and the EU’s MFF –
using the aforementioned price levels to the year 2009, which we assign as the base-year
since it is the last available via WIOD. Of course, the specific year used as the base year
does not matter once all prices are in real terms. The model was solved in 2009 constant
prices, year by year from 2007 to 2013 at the maximum level of disaggregation (35 sectors
and 41 countries/regions); after that, we summed results across the seven-year period.
As previously stated, the E-MRIO analysis allows weighting direct and indirect effects
of for a pre-determined level of final demand. Therefore, to capture the consequences of
a selected policy, we first had to allocate the all EU budget line items to targeted sectors
and countries. This resulted in a harmonized country-sector vector that formed the final
demand vector for our exercise. The operation itself was nontrivial, given the different
sector classifications between the twomain databases: 35 industries inWIOD and 18 (ISIC
Rev. 3) for the social indicators that we developed. First, we redistributed the funds to the
35 WIOD sectors; see Table S4 in SI and notes to look into total amounts and exclusions,
and also Table S7 in SI for reports used. After that, we aggregated both the WIOD table
and the final demand vector to 15 of the 18 ISIC Rev.3 sectors (‘Agriculture’ and ‘Fishing’
were aggregated as inWIOD; and ‘territorial organizations and bodies’ and ‘not elsewhere
classified’ discarded because their low numbers and difficulties to allocate) following the
correspondences in Table S3 of the SI, which is available online.
Table S5 and S6 in the SI show the share and amount of each budget heading as allocated
to the 15 ISIC Rev.3 sectors. Here we clarify twomatters pertaining to the way we allocated
funds to final demand. The detail (or lack thereof) provided by each EU report on the
MFF conditions our sectoral and country allocations. For example, reports on Cohesion
andAgricultural Policies gave sufficient detail for 78% of the total budget-to allow us to dis-
tribute funds easily across both sectors and countries. For the remaining 22% of the budget
we allocated by sector based only a description of the project and inmany cases were forced
to allocate across sectors and country by using information on the 78% for which we had
near-perfect information (see Table S7 and its notes in the SI). Also, a nonnegligible part
of the funds is a set of direct transfers to targeted households (particular demographic
or income groups). We assigned such transfers to ‘Final-consumption-expenditure-by-
households’ sector in WIOD; this means we necessarily also assumed that the receivers of
the transfers consume goods and services in the same shares as does the average consumer
in the assigned country.
3. Results and discussion
Much literature discusses the dominance of either regional or global relationships in supply
chains (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015; Los et al., 2015). We find that the main eco-
nomic beneficiaries, both direct and indirect, of the European policies are member states
with small fractions of the value added (12%) that leak out worldwide (that boost out-
side economies). This points to the importance of so-called ‘factory Europe’ (Baldwin and
Lopez-Gonzalez, 2015) in fulfilling the demand triggered by European Funds. A different
composition of this demand (for example, a demand highly concentrated in the durables
goods) could lead to a more dominating role of global relationships instead of those more
regional – more internal to the EU (Bems et al., 2010). In the regional network linked
to the demand created by EU funds, northern European countries like Germany or the
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United Kingdom are core economies, which are deeply integrated into European supply-
chains, while economies of southern and eastern European countries are more peripheral,
as defined by their heavy dependence on just a handful of trade partners. As a consequence
of this structure, there clear are first- and second-class winners within the EU.Northern EU
countries, which perform best on the Global Competitiveness Index (Priede and Neuert,
2015), receive absolutely and proportionally more capital and labor compensation than
do southern and eastern EU countries (see Table 1 for the results and countries in each
group). The differences are even starker when we examine the findings for skilled cate-
gories of labor; Northern countries receive nearly half of the total compensation received
by all EU high- and medium-skilled labor (47% and 46% respectively) but only just over
a quarter (29%) of the compensation received by all EU low-skilled labor. In addition, a
focus on the hours worked, rather than compensation received, further widens the appar-
ent discrepancies, leading to social results that differ markedly from the economic ones
already reported. That is, a relevant part of the total hours worked (34%) are ‘imported’
into Europe and mainly in the form of low-skilled labor. Within the EU, hours worked are
concentrated in eastern and southern Europe, even for high- and medium-skilled labor.
Our general set of findings is in line with those of other studies. The main positive
effects of global value chains positive are retained by developed countries, while less pos-
itive effects spill over into developing economies via international trade (Alsamawi et al.,
2014a). Our results are notable in highlighting that expenditures emanating from Euro-
pean Funds reinforce and deepen these broader trends, rather than offset them as intended.
This is demonstrated in Figure S1 in the online SI, which reveals what appears to be a pat-
tern of negative impacts pattern from European Funds, both outside and inside the EU, in
the form of more hours worked, more temporary employment and lower compensation
per worker for all kinds of skills (except for low-skilled labor) than the business as usual
(BAU) performance of the economy.
3.1. The socioeconomic impact of European policies: an indicator-by-indicator
analysis
In general, European Funds are widely dispersed across the EU. Still, member countries in
the south and east are endowed with 75% more funding per inhabitant than are member
countries in the north. Despite this differential, peripheral countries (those in the EU south
and east) accrue just 48% of the total VA generated globally by the spending of those Funds
– 12 percentage points less than their initial endowment share, while the EU core gets
nearly the same share (39%); the remaining 12% leaks to other world regions.
A more detailed analysis of income distribution identifies further limitations of the
benefits ultimately allocated to peripheral countries. Northern EU countries obtain 43%
of all labor compensation benefits of the MFF, but southern and eastern EU countries
get just 31% and 19%, respectively. Wage gaps and sparser interindustry structures in
peripheral further boost the net benefits per worker for northern EU economies. They
are three and six times higher than they are for southern and eastern countries despite
similar or even larger degrees of leakage exhibited by economies of northern EU nations
(29–31% and 31–35% of southern and eastern parts of the EU, respectively, compared to
37–38% observed in its north). Kali and Reyes (2007) note that human capital and interna-










Table 1. EU funds spillover by indicator and region.
NORTHERN EU SOUTHERN EU EASTERN EU NAFTA CHINA EAST ASIA BRIIAT RoW
FUNDS BENEFICIARY EU-FUNDS (Millione) 288,035.5 40% 250,024.2 34% 192,029.2 26% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
per capita (e) 1,082.6 22% 1,888.2 39% 1,892.4 39% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
VALUE ADDED TOTAL (Millione) 266,976.2 39% 199,076.7 29% 131,389.6 19% 17,151.6 3% 13,968.7 2% 8,225.8 1% 15,967.5 2% 24,453.0 4%
CAPITAL COMPENSATION 94,037.4 35% 72,618.7 27% 55,790.8 21% 8,803.0 3% 8,763.0 3% 3,722.4 1% 8,362.4 3% 18,723.4 7%
Domestic impact 70,918.2 38% 64,740.2 35% 50,061.7 27% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 32,761.4 38% 25,285.2 30% 27,054.4 32% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 23,119.3 27% 7,878.5 9% 5,729.1 7% 8,803.0 10% 8,763.0 10% 3,722.4 4% 8,362.4 10% 18,723.4 22%
LABOR COMPENSATION 172,938.8 43% 126,458.0 31% 75,598.8 19% 8,348.6 2% 5,205.7 1% 4,503.5 1% 7,605.2 2% 5,729.6 2%
HIGH SKILLED 72,203.5 47% 45,337.6 30% 26,954.8 18% 3,705.2 3% 477.3 0% 1,742.9 1% 1,763.5 1% 1,129.4 1%
Domestic impact 56,569.2 46% 42,081.1 34% 25,158.2 20% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 10,801.3 37% 8,962.1 30% 9,742.3 33% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 15,634.3 53% 3,256.5 11% 1,796.5 6% 3,705.2 13% 477.3 2% 1,742.9 6% 1,763.5 6% 1,129.4 4%
MEDIUM SKILLED 76,401.2 46% 37,965.6 23% 37,521.3 22% 4,233.1 3% 1,913.9 1% 2,282.7 1% 4,005.8 2% 3,514.5 2%
Domestic impact 55,531.0 45% 33,532.5 27% 33,234.6 27% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 16,779.6 37% 13,034.0 29% 15,726.4 35% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 20,870.2 46% 4,433.1 10% 4,286.7 9% 4,233.1 9% 1,913.9 4% 2,282.7 5% 4,005.8 9% 3,514.5 8%
LOW SKILLED 24,334.1 29% 43,154.8 51% 11,122.8 13% 410.3 0% 2,814.5 3% 477.8 1% 1,835.9 2% 1,085.6 1%
Domestic impact 17,853.2 27% 38,593.0 58% 9,973.9 15% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 7,177.1 38% 5,846.9 31% 5,791.6 31% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 6,480.9 34% 4,561.8 24% 1,148.9 6% 410.3 2% 2,814.5 15% 477.8 3% 1,835.9 10% 1,085.6 6%
WORKED HOURS TOTAL (Million hours) 6,534.9 15% 7,917.8 18% 13,895.7 32% 672.0 2% 5,933.5 14% 445.7 1% 4,217.5 10% 3,419.7 8%
HIGH SKILLED 1,927.9 24% 1,795.3 22% 2,995.1 37% 294.6 4% 316.4 4% 144.9 2% 344.8 4% 304.4 4%
Domestic impact 1,547.0 26% 1,667.1 28% 2,816.5 47% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 727.2 38% 539.5 29% 625.7 33% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 380.9 20% 128.1 7% 178.6 9% 116.0 6% 316.4 17% 144.9 8% 344.8 18% 304.4 16%
MEDIUM SKILLED 3,310.2 17% 2,376.4 13% 7,643.9 40% 286.1 2% 1,954.5 10% 229.2 1% 1,649.6 9% 1,503.1 8%
Domestic impact 2,469.2 22% 2,145.2 19% 6,835.9 60% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 2,954.3 39% 2,022.9 27% 2,525.4 34% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 841.0 11% 231.2 3% 808.0 11% 286.1 4% 1,954.5 26% 229.2 3% 1,649.6 22% 1,503.1 20%
LOW SKILLED 1,296.8 8% 3,746.1 23% 3,256.7 20% 91.3 1% 3,662.5 23% 71.7 0% 2,223.2 14% 1,612.2 10%
Domestic impact 967.2 13% 3,396.3 47% 2,923.5 40% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 3,594.4 41% 2,439.1 28% 2,639.9 30% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%




















21.6 – 19.5 – 9.5 – 5.0 – 2.7 – 10.2 – 8.3 – 2.7 –
HIGH-SKILLED 29,6 – 26,9 – 14,9 – 11,6 – 3,6 – 13,4 – 21,0 – 6,0 –
MEDIUM-SKILLED 21,9 – 16,9 – 8,8 – 9,2 – 2,3 – 9,4 – 8,4 – 3,8 –
LOW-SKILLED 17,9 – 13,9 – 8,0 – 1,7 – 1,8 – 8,1 – 5,4 – 1,1 –
LABOURMARKET TEMPORARY
EMPLOYMENT (thousands)
457.7 10% 645.5 14% 874.1 19% 20.3 0% 1,985.4 43% 23.1 0% 431.0 9% 195.6 4%
Domestic impact 363.5 21% 574.9 33% 806.0 46% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 1,165.6 40% 746.5 26% 976.1 34% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 94.2 3% 70.6 2% 68.1 2% 20.3 1% 1,985.4 69% 23.1 1% 431.0 15% 195.6 7%
PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT
(thousands)
1,025.7 31% 531.3 16% 562.6 17% 39.6 1% 0.7 0% 29.6 1% 870.9 27% 208.0 6%
Domestic impact 827.2 46% 453.1 25% 516.4 29% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Leakage 677.8 46% 406.1 28% 387.8 26% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
Boost 198.6 13% 78.2 5% 46.2 3% 39n6 3% 0.7 0% 29.6 2% 870.9 59% 208.0 14%
Sources: Own estimations. PPP data elaborated from (OCDE, 2017), labor compensation and worked hours by skill elaborated fromWIOD. Temporary and Part-time employment elaborated from
LFS-Eurostat, ILOSTAT and ASPIRE and the first one does not include self-employed persons by definition (see SI for sources of divergences). NORTHERN EU: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark,
Finland, France,UnitedKingdom, Luxembourg,Netherlands andSweden. SOUTHERNEU: Spain,Greece, Ireland, Italy andPortugal. EASTERNEU: Bulgaria, Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Estonia,Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakian Republic and Slovenia. NAFTA: United States, Mexico and Canada. BRIIAT: Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Australia and Turkey. East Asia: Japan,
Taiwan and Korea. RoW: rest of the world. Boost and leakage definitions: boost is the indirect impact received by a country triggered by other’s countries final demand linked to the Funds. The
indirect impact is a boost for the receiving country and a leakage for the country that is sending it. The boosts and the leakages of each of the three European big regions are the aggregations
of the boosts and leakages generated individually in each country.
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acknowledge that northern EU countries are ‘core’ to Europe’s supply-chain networks,
they still found the positive effects of its higher levels of human capital to be higher than
expected. This same agglomerative effect of industry integration might also explain the
higher share of labor compensation in northern Europe (43%) than its share of total value
added (39%).
We observe comparable results for capital compensation. In this case, however, the
leakage to the RoW regions is much more relevant (it accounts for 18% of total capital
compensation). The increasingly intensive trade relationships between the EU and devel-
oping economies as well as the rising world presence of EUmultinational firms enable this
leakage of European Funds.
The economic discrepancies of findings for countries inside and outside of the EU are
pronounced even more via a footprint in terms of labor hours. In this instance, the RoW
provides 35% of all work hours required to attend to EU Funds spending (compared to just
8% for compensation). Labor hours within the EU account for 65%. The core–peripheral
relationship switches, however, with the EU’s northern and southern countries accounting
for just 15% and 18% of labor hours, respectively, while its eastern countries account for
32%. The peripheral EU regions, particularly the east, are performing as labor-intensive
‘factories’. Furthermore, the distinction of labor hours worked by skill level accentuate the
matter even further. Low-skilled hours worked accounts for only 8% in northern EU coun-
tries, but 43% for southern and eastern EU countries combined and 48% for the RoW.
Underlining this disparity are China and BRIIAT (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, Aus-
tralia, and Turkey), which maintain 23% and 14% of the total, respectively. Conversely,
hours worked by high- and medium-skilled labor are generated mainly within the EU
and in higher shares than are hours worked by low-skilled labor. This imbalance observed
between value added generated and the hours required to produce the goods and services
by skill clues into potential global inequalities in terms of the quality of the work generated
by European Funds. It demonstrates Feenstra (2007) hypothesis about the outsourcing of
lower-skilled jobs. It also reaffirms the so-called ‘race to the bottom’ observed by Xiao et al.
(2017a).
This general pattern is also highlighted by an analysis of average hourlywages in terms of
purchasing power parity (PPP). For each of the labor skills analyzed, northern EU coun-
tries have higher wages than do the other two EU areas. Similarly, on average, workers
within the EU as a whole tend to earn more money per hour than do workers in of its
trading-partner nations throughout the RoW. Within the EU, these differences explain
how northern EU countries retain a higher share of the wages generated by the Funds,
while the higher shares in terms of hours are in eastern EU countries. NAFTA is somewhat
of an outlier, however; its results for high-skilled labor are similar to those for north-
ern EU countries, but the gap for the rest of the jobs is more akin to those obtained for
southern and eastern EU nations. While this seems to be a bit of an enigma, these coun-
tervailing facts could be explained by the aggregation in single area of three very different
economies: a highly developed and equal economy (Canada), a developing and unequal
economy (Mexico), and a highly developed and unequal one (United States), as discussed
by Alsamawi et al. (2014b). The case of developing economies like China, BRIIAT and the
RoW is important. They are labor intensive with very low wages; So, in this respect they
could have clear comparative advantages compared to capital-intensive, high-wage region
like Europe, at least so long as transactions and transportation costs are negligible. Clearly
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European Funds are facilitating Simas et al.’s (2014) ‘bad labor footprint’, which gets at
the idea of developed regions enabling and expanding poor labor conditions in developing
regions.
By examining the footprints of temporary and part-time labor we can identify differ-
ences in the maturity and flexibility of the labor markets (Table 1). Neither indicator is
directly tied to negative social impacts; but the concentration of temporary and part-time
employment in low-wage economies and in jobs with low skills can be a sign of labor inse-
curity, and the type of employment contract is a clear channel for growing inequality (Görg
and Görlich, 2015). In this sense, the results show how temporary employment generated
by European Funds lacks a major presence in northern EU or NAFTA regions. But large
shares do appear in eastern EU countries (19%) and China (43%). Part-time employment
is also relevant to northern EU countries (31%), although it does not seem to be linked
to poor labor conditions. The results vis-à-vis part-time labor in southern and eastern EU
countries are comparatively high, and some sites do have poorer labor conditions clearly
when combined with other indicators, such as high shares of labor with low wages and
low skills, poor conditions can dominate. Following the ILO standards, work conditions
should ensure, among other things, freedom, equity, and security (Gómez-Paredes et al.,
2016); our combined study of indicators including temporary and part-time employment
figures appear to reveal an increase in the risk of inequality footprints emanating from
activities in developed countries.
3.2. Intra-EU impact leakages: the path to cohesion?
As demonstrated, the dynamics enabled by the MFF differ within the EU. A deeper look at
the data helps us assess whether or not the social outcomes of the funds are in line with the
major European objective – enhanced cohesion of member states. To this end, we chose
two socioeconomic indicators relating to income generation and hours worked by skill
level in terms of a balance for the impacts, the difference between spillovers (the impact
a country receives from others) and leakage (the impact that leaks from one country to
others directly through imports alone) among countries (Figure 1), considering only the
intra-EU impacts. Results close to zero point out countries with balanced impacts between
spillover and leakage effects emanating from international specialization. The higher the
positive balance, the higher the impact, direct and indirect, themember state receives from
the European Funds.
Most developed countries within the EU are net exporters of high- andmedium-skilled
labor compensation via other EU countries’ imports. That is, these net exporting countries
receive more indirect impacts from the Funds than from the indirect impacts that leak
from them.Germany stands out; its powerful economy obtains significant economic effects
via the production of value-added intensive goods and services indirectly via demands
from other EU countries. Spending of European Funds in peripheral regions reverber-
ates strongly throughout Germany’s economy. Countries such as the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Austria, and Belgiumobtain similar positive benefits from such spending. On
the other side, peripheral countries leak more than spills over to them, at least in terms of
labor compensation. In this instance, Poland stands out as a net importer (greater leakages)
of all kinds of labor compensation.
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Figure 1. Net impact balance of labor compensation (left) andworked hours (right) footprint within the
EU by skill category.
Top trading partners (Table 2) can help give some sense of the nature of the net bal-
ance. Germany and the United Kingdom are the main exporting countries (economies
improved by spillovers) of high-skilled work in terms of both compensation and hours.
France, a core EU country as well, is remarkable vis-à-vis spillovers but also presents
noteworthy leakage of low- and medium-skilled labor compensation. Italy is another odd
case but has a pattern opposite of France’s, as, in net, it exports low- and medium-skilled
labor compensation while, in net, it imports high-skilled labor compensation due to its in-
between position inside the EU (a developed country of the south withmiddling pay levels
and specialized in medium- to low-skilled labor). The right-hand side of Table 2 presents
the net balance of worked hours by skill, considering, again, exclusively intra-EU flows. In
this case, differences between European regions are clear. Only three of the most devel-
oped European economies (Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are net
exporters of high-skilled labor hours. Southern countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece
and even France) are net importers of large amounts of high- and medium-skilled labor
hours, although in some cases, they are net exporters of low-skilled hours. AsTable 2 shows,
those flows of high- and medium-skilled labor come mainly from core countries but also
from eastern EU countries, like Poland, the Czech Republic or Slovakia, which are highly













Table 2. Top labor compensation and worked hours exporter and importer countries by skill category.
HIGH SKILL
LABOR COMPENSATION LABOR HOURS
Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
Poland DEU 37% GBR 15% FRA 9% Poland DEU 26% GBR 14% ESP 7%
Spain DEU 28% FRA 21% GBR 12% France DEU 22% ESP 20% GBR 14%
France DEU 32% GBR 16% ESP 15% Spain DEU 21% FRA 18% GBR 11%
Germany GBR 22% FRA 16% NLD 14% Germany GBR 17% POL 14% FRA 11%
Italy DEU 30% FRA 16% GBR 13% Italy DEU 21% ESP 13% FRA 12%
Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
Germany POL 16% FRA 10% ESP 9% Germany POL 16% FRA 10% ESP 9%
United Kingdom IRL 16% POL 12% DEU 11% United Kingdom IRL 16% POL 13% DEU 11%
France ESP 19% DEU 12% POL 10% Spain PRT 25% FRA 18% ITA 9%
Netherlands DEU 12% ESP 10% POL 10% Poland DEU 14% LTU 10% CZE 9%
Spain PRT 26% FRA 17% POL 8% France ESP 19% DEU 12% ITA 10%
MEDIUM SKILL
LABOR COMPENSATION LABOR HOURS
Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
Poland DEU 37% ITA 10% GBR 10% Poland DEU 25% CZE 14% HUN 9%
France DEU 32% ITA 14% GBR 11% Germany POL 23% CZE 15% GBR 8%
Spain DEU 28% FRA 15% ITA 13% France DEU 22% POL 14% ITA 12%
Germany GBR 14% NLD 12% ITA 11% Spain DEU 20% POL 12% ITA 11%
Italy DEU 32% FRA 13% GBR 9% Hungary DEU 21% POL 20% CZE 12%
Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
Germany POL 16% FRA 11% ESP 9% Germany POL 16% FRA 10% ESP 9%
Italy FRA 14% POL 13% ESP 13% Poland DEU 14% LTU 10% CZE 9%
United Kingdom IRL 16% POL 12% DEU 11% Italy FRA 14% POL 13% ESP 13%
France ESP 18% DEU 12% ITA 11% United Kingdom IRL 16% POL 12% DEU 11%













LABOR COMPENSATION LABOR HOURS
Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater LEAKS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
France ITA 24% ESP 22% DEU 11% France ESP 24% ITA 18% ROU 11%
Poland ITA 22% DEU 17% GBR 11% Spain PRT 30% ITA 16% ROU 10%
Spain ITA 22% PRT 17% FRA 15% Poland ITA 17% ROU 14% DEU 13%
Germany ITA 20% NLD 16% ESP 12% Germany ITA 15% ROU 13% ESP 12%
Greece ITA 31% DEU 10% NLD 8% Italy ROU 23% ESP 17% DEU 9%
Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%) Greater BOOSTS (TOP-5) Top trading partners (%)
Italy FRA 15% POL 13% ESP 13% Romania HUN 12% ITA 12% POL 10%
Spain PRT 25% FRA 20% ITA 9% Italy FRA 15% POL 13% ESP 13%
Germany POL 16% FRA 11% ESP 9% Spain PRT 24% FRA 21% ITA 10%
United Kingdom IRL 16% POL 12% FRA 11% Germany POL 15% FRA 10% ESP 9%
France ESP 18% DEU 12% ITA 11% Bulgaria GRC 30% ROU 16% POL 7%
Sources: Own estimations.
Notes: CZE: Czech Republic. DEU: Germany. ESP: Spain. FRA: France. GBR: United Kingdom. GRC: Greece. HUN: Hungary. IRL: Ireland. ITA: Italy. LTU: Lithuania. NLD: Netherlands. POL: Poland. PRT:
Portugal. ROU: Romania.Only considered intra-EUflows. Top5LEAKSallude to topnet importing countries andTop5BOOSTS to topnet exporting countries becauseof the EUFund’s expenditures.
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Figure 2. Worldwide flows of Labor Compensation (million euros) and Worked hours (million) by skill
category.
Note: Note to upper Figure: The color scale on the background map represents the labor compensation
boost received by each region (all skill levels). The arrows depict labor compensation flows by skill level
embodied in EU imports from foreign regions. The graphic on the left shows the participation of each
origin region (including the EU) in the total labor compensation footprint of the EU. Note to lower Figure:
The color scale on the background map represents the labor hours boost received by each region (all
skill levels). The arrows depict physical labor flows by skill level embodied in EU imports from foreign
regions. The graphic on the left shows the participation of each origin region (including the EU) in total
labor hours footprint of the EU.
Their spatial proximity toGermany economic influence underlie these results (Bruno et al.,
2012). At the extreme other end of the scale, Romania and Bulgaria stand out as transi-
tion economies via net exportation of low-skilled labor hours; indeed, they are among the
top-five exporting countries of such labor to other peripheral countries (Table 2). These
outcomes show that even within eastern Europe, different patterns of labor specialization
exist that yield different economic structures.
A look at both sides of Table 2 reveals the unequal distribution of value added generated
and labor hours required to produce the goods and services demanded by European coun-
tries. Labor compensation is more widely spread among European countries than are labor
16 F. MONSALVE ET AL.
hours, which concentrate in eastern EU. This divergence exemplifies the wage gap inside
the EU: while income spillovers benefit most countries, especially those at the EU core,
physical labor behind that production concentrates in EU transition economies which tend
to have lower salaries. The positive economic effects of the Funds are not only dispensed to
those countries that physically receive the Funds but also to core EU countries with more
developed trade structures. This result in three types of impacts, which can be classified by
the type of region: EU core countries, EU peripheral countries and the RoW.
3.3. Outer-EU impact leakages: a sustainable social footprint?
From a global perspective, there is a clear distinction between the leakages of total jobs
(34%) and labor compensation (8%).We find that some producer’s search for comparative
advantages in terms of low worker pay. A main exporting region of high- and medium-
skilled labor compensation is the set of NAFTA countries, followed distantly by the RoW’s
regions (black arrows in upper Map in Figure 2). The main exporter of low-skilled labor
compensation is China (purple arrows). By contrast, low-skilled workers from develop-
ing countries (lower map in Figure 2) provide major flows of physical labor to supply
EU demands. China again stands out: its labor compensation is a minor participant in
global monetary flows (1.4%); but its share of work hours embodied in imports (13.8%)
reveal it is a major player. Similar patterns are observed for the case of the BRIIAT and
RoW regions. The finding for NAFTA countries are quite the opposite when compar-
ing the physical and monetary flows. So we conclude that final demand triggered by the
European Funds induces significant income spillovers for NAFTA countries, although it
requires a surprising amount of physical labor from Asia and other emerging economies.
Thewage gap between the regions underlies those results. The results forNAFTA countries
are comparable to the leakage from the most developed regions within the EU. They reveal
that substantial inequality is promoted by European demand. This leads us to question
the alignment of EU principles with the indirect demand-side effects of European Funds’
allocations.
4. Conclusions
EU financial efforts have benefited both developed and less developed member countries.
So, the Emperor is definitely enrobed. But, in the light of the analysis herein, it appears
not to be the sort of robe that should be proudly paraded about in public. That is, from a
social perspective, the consequences of EU expenditures are not aligned with EU guiding
principles. That is, the intensity of trade relationships within the EU affects demand-side
outcomes that yield unintended consequences. So, the spending of EU funds yields first-
and second-class winners that align with core and peripheral economies rather than with
the original distribution of those funds.
We show that both economic differences in economic structure among EU regions
and each country’s relative position within global supply chains redirect the economic
effects of European financial efforts to benefit its more disadvantaged economies. Thus,
within this framework, more advanced EU member countries paradoxically benefit much
more from the EU spending than expected. They benefit from a more mature economic
structure, which positions them as hubs of EU activity benefit more from their own and
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other countries’ EU public investments. Baldwin (2013) suggests that core economies’
exports contain a comparatively small shares of imported intermediates, while peripheral
economies’ exports contain higher shares. EU Funds leak from less powerful peripheral
economies to the EU core since their economic structure is not able tomeet demands of the
EUFunds on their own. The leakage from these countries therefore boosts themoremature
economies formost of the important positive indicators in our analysis, e.g. income genera-
tion and distribution, and the creation of high- andmedium-skilled jobs. Meanwhile more
working hours are generated in the eastern section of the EU, in labor-intensive industries
with lower quality jobs. Thus relative wealth is built up in the EU core.
Widening the scope, there are also other unintended consequences worldwide that
deserve scrutiny. The spending of European Funds triggers much greater increases in cap-
ital compensation than in labor compensation in regions such as China, RoW or BRIIAT,
although a disproportionate number of the working hours is generated in China. Most
of the affected emerging countries are contributing via industries that are labor intensive.
The results are driven by the low rates of pay as well as the rising presence of multinational
and subsidiary firms in developed countries. Unfortunately, these same nations are affili-
ated with poorer working conditions, reflected in significant large number of low-skilled
working hours and temporary jobs created there via the EU funds.
This study leads us to conclude that globalization is threatening, the EU’s high social
mores that are fundamental to the Union’s policies. This is the case of social outcomes
even within its own borders. The solution is not a matter of constraining free trade; rather,
it means that, at least, more care should be taken so that expenditures funded by the EU are
assured to be committed to those standards.Our analysis helps to identify holes in the value
chains of peripheral countries that appear to severely alter the effects of EU programs. We,
therefore, suggest that tooled with knowledge of probable outcomes from alternative uses
of EU Funds, policymakers could sharpen investments toward the goal of improving the
sustainability of the EU economy through its global value chains. Further research should
be undertaken to assess the ultimate supply-side effects triggered by the European policies
to enhance productivity gains. In the case of the EU, such measures could help strengthen
the EU target of intercountry convergence of GDP per capita. They could be designed to
minimize the income leakages from southern and eastern EU member countries to their
northern partners. Actions to enhance European labor markets, particularly those regard-
ing education and improving worker skills, should be a major focus as well. Policies should
be directed not only toward alleviating wage gaps but also toward reducing differences in
labor market flexibility and toward increasing employment opportunities for labor with
higher skill levels. In particular, the target of cohesion can only be fulfilled if more flex-
ible structures in southern and eastern EU countries are accompanied by a transition to
more efficient and innovative work force. This would improve the workers’ professional
qualifications as well as the working conditions of labor there. If such a transition is not
undertaken, flexibility could facilitate labor insecurity, a trap that reared its ugly head in
the wake of the financial and economic crisis in a number of the countries in Europe’s
south and east.
Actions to address issues beyond EU borders are far more complex to address. The
intricate economic, financial and trade networks present challenge in terms of global
socioeconomic sustainability. EU policy should address actions in line with the sustain-
able public procurement and ensure that the global activity of EU firms and consumers is
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based on principles in line with EU social, economic and environmental mores. EUmulti-
national firms should do more to inform the public about their activity abroad so citizens
can assess the extent of the social drag caused bymultinationals and institutions. In this way
such organizations will bemotivated to do their best under principles of not only economic
cost-effectiveness but also social cost-effectiveness.
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